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MATERIAL EFFECT: SHIFTING THE BURDEN
OF PROOF FOR GREATER PROCEDURAL
RELIEF UNDER THE SOLDIERS' AND
SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 19401 provides civil
relief to military personnel serving on active duty by suspending legal
proceedings in which they are parties. The courts in many cases have
extended the full protection of the act to those who are within its scope in
order to fully promote the intent of Congress.
The participation of the United States in the Persian Gulf War has
recently revived an interest in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
The Act provides not only substantial protection from financial hard-
ships but also relief from pending judicial proceedings in which active
servicemembers are parties. Parties to lawsuits may seek civil relief from
courts while one litigant actively serves in the armed forces and for short
periods of time after the litigant's discharge.2 As servicemembers return
home to find lawsuits pending against them, or even already adjudicated
in their absence, the protections afforded by the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act may be employed to assure the rights of these individu-
als. This comment will analyze the procedure for applying for relief from
judicial proceedings under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, and
recommend that the burden of proof shift to servicemembers' opponents
to provide greater procedural relief.
Equally as important as the application procedure is the allocation
of the burden of proof since this burden directly affects whether courts
will grant relief. Most sections of the Act affording relief to ser-
vicemembers require servicemembers to show that their ability to appear
in court or comply with a judgment is "materially affected" by their mili-
tary service. To provide the relief envisioned by Congress, the burden of
showing that the servicemembers' ability to appear in court or comply
1. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178 (1940) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1988), amended by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-12, 105 Stat. 34).
2. Each section of the Act provides the time period during which courts may grant certain
types of relief to servicemembers.
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with a judgment is "materially affected" by military service should shift
from servicemembers to their opponents. Specifically, courts should find
that servicemembers have established a prima facie case "materially af-
fecting" their ability to defend their interests when the servicemembers
produce evidence that they are serving on active duty in the United
States military. Consequently, the burden should then shift to opposing
parties to show that the servicemembers' duty does not materially affect
their ability to engage in the proceedings or comply with judgment
orders.
II. HISTORY
Throughout history servicemembers have enjoyed relief from civil
obligations during times of war.' As early as the nineteenth century,
many states enacted statutory moratoriums barring enforcement of plain-
tiffs' rights against servicemembers.4 At the federal level, the United
States Congress enacted its first moratorium on civil actions against ser-
vicemen during the Civil War' by closing courts to plaintiffs seeking legal
redress against servicemembers.6 These laws were too restrictive as they
prevented creditors from filing lawsuits against servicemembers for the
duration of their military service. Instead of providing relief for ser-
vicemembers, these measures actually caused greater difficulties for ser-
vicemembers. For example, creditors often declined to extend credit to
enlisted persons as they feared being barred from any relief from ser-
vicemembers who defaulted on their obligations and then invoked the
moratorium provision. Congress modified this harsh approach with the
passage of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
In 1918, Congress drafted the first federal statute, the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918, 7 to provide relief for the vast number of
servicemembers in World War .8 The advent of the war disrupted all of
3. See Garth K. Chandler, The Impact of a Request for a Stay of Proceedings Under the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 102 MIL L. REV. 169 (1983).
4. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-166, SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF AcT 11
(1962).
5. Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1988))
cited in Timothy J. Grendell, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act: A Hurdle or a Wall?, 1
COMPLEAT LAW. 49, 53 n.2 (1984).
6. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-166, SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF Acr 11
(1962).
7. Act of Mar. 8, 1918, ch. 20, 40 Stat. 440 (1917-1919).
8. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-166, SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF AcT 11
(1962).
[Vol. 27:45
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America's activities and adversely affected the legal rights and responsi-
bilities of those servicemen called to serve in the war. Absent from
home, World War I servicemembers could not pursue and protect their
legal interests. As a result, Congress enacted the 1918 Act to protect the
civil rights of persons in the military both during and immediately after
their terms of service9 and to allow them to "devote their entire energy to
the military needs of the nation."1 Noting the problems inherent in
complete moratoriums, Congress greatly modified the forms of relief
from civil proceedings afforded servicemembers. Instead of a complete
moratorium on legal actions against servicemembers, the Act of 1918
provided for the exercise of judicial discretion in determining whether
the servicemembers' ability to protect their rights was deterred by their
active duty in the armed services. The 1918 Act, which expired after
World War I, suspended legal actions during the time of service if the
court determined that the serviceman's ability to protect his rights was
deterred by his active duty. In lieu of prohibiting all actions against ser-
vicemembers, Congress provided the courts with wide discretion in de-
termining whether to stay proceedings.11
The Act of 1940 is very similar to the original Act of 1918.12 Courts
remained open to suits against servicemembers. Although the Act main-
tained a forum for hearing cases against servicemembers, it also provided
for suspensions until servicemembers could protect their interests.
By 1942, with the war in Europe escalating, Congress saw the need
to revise the 1940 Act. a The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1942 clarified the intent of the Act and added some pro-
visions. 14 Congress broadened the purpose of the Act to prevent courts
from interpreting the Act too narrowly. 5 Subsequent amendments to
the Act focused on specific shortcomings which Congress sought to
ameliorate. 16
Congress originally intended to protect servicemembers from judg-
ments entered in their absence for the duration of the Second World
9. Act of Mar. 8, 1918, ch. 20, 40 Stat. 440 (1917-1919).
10. Clark v. Mechanics' Am. Nat' Bank, 282 F. 589, 591 (8th Cir. 1922).
11. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 809 (1943).
12. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-166, SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIF AcT 12
(1962).
13. Id.
14. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, Ch. 581, § 1, 56 Stat. 769
(1942) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591). The 1942 amendments included new tax
provisions which were later amended in 1944.
15. Id.
16. Id.
1991]
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War."7 The Act was to terminate six months after the war ended.18
However, Congress passed a subsequent provision which extended the
Act until such time as it is repealed. 9 Since Congress has not yet re-
pealed the Act, it is still in effect today. Due to the Persian Gulf War,
Congress has been considering more than fifty bills which would provide
additional relief to Americans serving on active duty in the military.20
III. PURPOSE
Congress enacted the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
194021 to suspend certain civil legal responsibilities of enlisted members
of the armed forces on active duty.22 Congress sought to protect the civil
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 584 (1988) (amended 1991). Section 584 provided that:
This Act... shall remain in force until May 15, 1945: Provided, That should the United
States be then engaged in a war, this Act... shall remain in force until such war is
terminated by a treaty of peace proclaimed by the President and for six months thereafter:
Provided further, That wherever under any section or provision of this Act... a proceed-
ing, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation, accounting, or other transaction has been author-
ized or provided with respect to military service performed prior to the date herein fixed
for the termination of this Act... such section or provision shall be deemed to continue in
full force and effect so long as may be necessary to the exercise or enjoyment of such
proceeding, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation, accounting, or other transaction.
Id.
18. Id.
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 464 (1988) (amended 1991). Section 464 extended the Act by its language:
"[A]II of the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended.., shall be
applicable to all persons ... inducted into the armed forces pursuant to this title... until such time
as the... [Act] ... is repealed or otherwise terminated by subsequent Act of the Congress .... " See
also ROBERT T. KIMBROUGH & JUDSON B. GLEN, AMERICAN LAW OF VETERANS § 845, at 603 n.3
(William E. Shipley ed., 2d ed. 1954).
20. Francesca L. Kritz, When Breadwinners Go Off to Fight, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
25, 1991, at 69.
21. 50 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1988). The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act is divided into
seven Articles. Id. §§ 501-91. Article I specifies the purpose, definitions, forum, persons protected,
and procedures for invoking the Act's relief. Id. §§ 510-17. Article II articulates the relief available
including stay of proceedings, and stay or vacation of execution of'judgments. Id. §§ 520-27. Arti-
cles III, IV, and V delineate various causes of action through which persons within the scope of the
Act may obtain relief. Article III describes benefits available to servicemembers and dependents. Id.
§§ 530-36. Article IV prevents a forfeiture on commercial life insurance policies. Id. §§ 540-48.
Article V explains the servicemember's rights regarding taxes, and mining or public land claims. Id.
§§ 560-74. Article VI prohibits unjust utilization of the Acts provisions. Id. §§ 580-584. Article
VII provides financial relief with a stay of enforcement of obligations. Id. at §§ 590-91.
22. Id. § 510. The purpose of the Act is to:
provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense under the emergent conditions
which are threatening the peace and security of the United States and to enable the United
States the more successfully to fulfill the requirements of the national defense, provision is
made to suspend enforcement of civil liabilities, in certain cases, of persons in the military
service of the United States in order to enable such persons to devote their entire energy to
the defense needs of the Nation, and to this end the following provisions are made for the
temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may prejudice the civil
rights of persons in such service during the period herein specified over which this Act
remains in force.
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rights of Americans who were called to the armed services and to ensure
that they would not be distracted from their service duties by concern
over their legal obligations at home.23 The court in Bowsman v. Peter-
son24 described the goals of the Act:
[F]irst, the maintenance in the armed forces of a reasonable measure of
that unbothered serenity and security in respect of personal responsi-
bilities which effectively promotes military efficiency and the national
defense; and secondly, the assurance that in the field of individual jus-
tice no advantage in judicial proceedings by or against a soldier or
sailor will result from his absorption in his country's defense.25
Congress passed the current Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act in
194026 when the United States anticipated upcoming world conflict.27 It
provided protection to American servicemembers against commence-
ment or continuance of legal proceedings when servicemembers could
not be present to protect their interests due to their military service.2 At
least one court has recognized that the Act may protect servicemembers,
but unfortunately may also slightly disadvantage opposing parties who
must wait until the servicemember is available to defend the suit.2 9 This
disadvantage to plaintiffs, however, is a necessary side effect of promot-
ing the goals of Congress.3"
Id.
23. See KIMBROUGH, supra note 19, at 602 n. 2.
24. 45 F. Supp. 741 (D. Neb. 1942).
25. Id. at 743. Other courts have also expressed patriotic fervor. The paternal policy of the
Act and "[t]he broad spirit of gratitude" towards persons in the Military Service of the United
States, which prompted the Act, "should control the courts in enforcing it." Benedict v. Higgins,
151 N.Y.S. 42, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915). The court in Patrikes v. J.C.H. Serv. Stations, 41
N.Y.S.2d 158, 166 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943) declares that "[s]o construed, the amendment accomplishes
the purpose for which it was enacted, and leaves the soldier disentangled to pursue his fight for our
material and spiritual heritage, and free to devote his entire energy to the defense needs of the
nation."
26. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178 (1940) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591 (1988)).
27. L. Sue Hayn, Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Update, 27-50-194 ARMY LAw. 40
(1989).
28. H.REP. No. 3001, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., (1940). According to House Report No. 3001, the
purpose of the statute is to free those who have been removed from their ordinary lifestyle "from
harassment and injury in connection with their civil affairs during their terms of service and thus
enable them the more successfully to devote their entire energies to the military needs of the Na-
tion." Id.
29. Bowsman, 45 F. Supp. at 744. In Bowsman the court recognized that:
It may be granted that a continuance will probably operate at least temporarily and per-
haps permanently to the disadvantage of the plaintiff. That result is unfortunate. But it is
a reasonable exaction by society from one of its members for its own preservation; a proper
imposition by the state upon an individual citizen in the course of its discharge of its consti-
tutional obligation to "provide for the common Defence."
30. "[It] is a reasonable exaction by society from one of its members for its own preservation; a
5
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Congress did not enact the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to
completely relieve servicemembers from their legal obligations. The
goals of the Act were threefold: to suspend civil judicial actions until
servicemembers could appear in court;31 to provide peace of mind to ser-
vicemembers fighting in World War II for the duration of their active
duty; and to maintain the status quo during the war by allowing legal
actions to be delayed for the duration of the conflict until ser-
vicemembers could return home to appear and defend their endangered
interests.32 In Holtzman's Furniture Store v. Schrapf,33 the Court of Ap-
peals of Louisiana reasoned that Congress did not intend the Act itself to
constitute a defense that servicemembers would assert in response to
plaintiffs' claims.34 It did, however, provide temporary relief from civil
proceedings needed by servicemembers on active duty.
IV. SCOPE oF THE ACT
Section 5111 defines the scope of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act. According to this section, the Act applies to "persons in the
military service"36 which includes "the following persons and no others:
All members of the Army of the United States, the United States Navy,
the Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and all officers of the
Public Health Service detailed by proper authority for duty either with
the Army or the Navy."37
Under the Act, the term "military service" signifies active military
service to the federal government with any military branch listed in sec-
tion 511.38 The Act applies to those currently serving in the military as
well as to those persons in "training or education under the supervision
of the United States preliminary to induction into the military service."3 9
Moreover, the term "active service" in section 511(1) is broadly defined
to include the time a servicemember is absent due to "sickness, wounds,
proper imposition by the state upon an individual citizen in the course of its discharge of its constitu-
tional obligation to provide for the common Defence." Id.
31. 50 U.S.C. app. § 510 (1988) (amended 1991). According to § 510, "[Ihe following provi-
sions are made for the temoporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions." Id.
32. Hayn, supra note 27, at 40.
33. 39 So. 2d 450 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
34. Id. at 452.
35. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511 (1988) (amended 1991).
36. Congress used the phrase "person in the military service" throughout the Act.
37. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511(1) (amended 1991).
38. Id.
39. Id.
[Vol. 27:45
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leave, or other lawful cause."'  In addition to those enlisted in an active
branch of the service, the Act also applies to any Enlisted Reserve Corps
members who have been ordered to report to active duty.4 1
Certain protections afforded by the Act extend beyond enlisted per-
sons to cover their dependents as well. Dependents of military ser-
vicemembers may invoke the protection of the Act for some benefits.42
For example, dependents may, upon application to the court, receive
benefits provided by sections 530-536 of the Act which include relief with
respect to eviction for nonpayment of rent, 3 installment sales con-
tracts,44 mortgages, 45 trust deeds,' leases,4 7 nonpayment of life insur-
ance policies,48 and enforcement of storage liens.49  Additionally,
dependents are entitled to relief from the sale of property to collect
taxes.5 0 Courts may grant any such relief if it determines that the depen-
dent's ability to comply with the obligation has been "materially im-
paired by reason of the military service of the person upon whom the
applicants are dependant."' l
In addition to protection of servicemembers and their dependents,
some provisions may even apply to persons secondarily liable on a ser-
vicemember's obligation. 2 When courts have granted relief to the per-
son in the military service, they may, in their discretion, stay, postpone
or suspend proceedings or orders against persons secondarily liable on
obligations of servicemembers 53  Courts may also vacate or set aside
judgments against third parties whether primarily or secondarily liable.54
Furthermore, courts may not enforce provisions of a criminal bail bond
40. Id. Servicemembers who have been court-martialed may not be considered on active duty.
In Mantz v. Mantz, 69 N.E.2d 637 (Ohio C.P. 1946), a soldier was confined under court-martial for
five years and then dishonorably discharged. The court found he was not on active duty for the
purposes of invoking the Act.
41. 50 U.S.C. app. § 516 (amended 1991). The Act applies to those who enlist of their own
volition, as well as to those who are drafted. See Hanebuth v. Patton, 142 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1943).
See also Hanebuth v. Scott, 142 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1943).
42. 50 U.S.C. app. § 536 (1988).
43. Id. § 530 (amended 1991).
44. Id. § 531 (amended 1991).
45. Id. § 532 (amended 1991).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 534 (amended 1991).
48. Id. § 535 (amended 1991).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 560.
51. Id. § 536.
52. Id. § 513 (amended 1991). A stay, postponement, or suspension may be granted to "sure-
ties, guarantors, endorsers, accommodation makers, and others ...." Id. § 513(1)
53. Id.
54. Id. § 513(2).
1991]
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when the sureties are unable to enforce attendance of the principal due to
the principal's military service."
However, courts will not often extend the Act to protect non-mili-
tary persons such as their co-defendants or business partners. In Gilbride
v. City of Algona,56 the Iowa Supreme Court clearly stated that "the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act is for the benefit of the party in
service only."57 The court in Gilbride refused to grant a stay of condem-
nation proceedings against property owners, including two enlisted de-
fendants who each owned a minor interest in the property.58 The owners
of the remaining interests were not allowed to invoke the protection of
the Act to delay proceedings.59 Although the servicemembers were un-
able to appear, the court found the rights of the servicemembers were not
materially affected by absence due to military service because their inter-
ests would be adequately represented by the other parties.'
Similarly, in Patrikes v. J. C.H. Service Stations,61 the trial court did
not allow the business partners of a servicemember called to service to
invoke the Act to avoid a lease agreement.62 Holding that only the ser-
vicemember could be relieved of liability on the lease and the remaining
partners who were not servicemembers were still liable, the court rea-
soned that business partners do not enjoy the same status as dependents
under the Act because they do not look to servicemembers for "support
and maintenance... for the reasonable necessities of life."63 The courts
in Gilbride and Patrikes made one point very clear: non-servicemembers
cannot easily invoke the Act to gain protection from litigation.
Nonetheless, a plaintiff should request leave of the court to proceed
against any other defendant who is not serving in the military."
Although such co-defendants may not invoke the Act for their own pro-
tection, they may request the court to stay the proceeding against all
defendants on the grounds that proceeding on the matter may materially
55. Id. § 513(3). The surety may be required to show unsuccessful efforts to enforce the de-
fendant's appearance. Cumbie v. State, 367 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
56. 20 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1945).
57. Id. at 908.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 41 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd, 46 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943).
62. Id. at 167.
63. Id. The court further stated, "The soldier's status does not operate to release partners who
are not called to service." Id. Similarly, in Grimes v. State, 377 P.2d 847 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963), a
defendant was not entitled to relief under the act where his attorney, a member of the armed serv-
ices, was unable to appear with the defendant.
64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 524 (1988).
[Vol. 27:45
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prejudice the interest of the absent defendant on active military duty.6"
V. RELIEF FROM JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act provides three means of
relief from judicial proceedings for servicemembers while they are on ac-
tive duty.6 Servicemembers may request a stay of proceedings, a reopen-
ing of a default judgment against the servicemember, or a stay of
execution of judgment.67 To invoke the Act's provisions for relief, ser-
vicemembers must show that duty in the service has materially affected
their ability to protect their legal rights in the case. 8
A. Stay of Proceedings
Courts may grant stays of civil proceedings when they find it neces-
sary to protect the rights of servicemembers. Section 521 of the Act
states:
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a
person in military service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant,
during the period of such service or within sixty days thereafter may,
in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its own motion,
and shall, on application to it by such person or some person on his
behalf, be stayed as provided in this Act... unless, in the opinion of
the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defend-
ant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his
military service.6
9
A court in its discretion may determine whether a stay should be granted
based upon the facts of the particular case. Again, a court should look
to the purpose of the Act to aid in rendering its decision. On one hand,
the purpose of the Act is to protect and promote the well-being of ser-
vicemembers by suspending civil actions temporarily.70 On the other
hand, a court must limit such protection if necessary to prevent a party
from abusing the Act's provisions.
To this end, servicemembers must show that their defense is "mate-
rially affected" by their military duties. Furthermore, servicemembers
must also show they acted with due diligence to appear in court. In Palo
65. See Lanham v. Cline, 44 F. Supp. 897 (D. Idaho 1942). See also McArthur v. Shaffer, 139
P.2d 959 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
66. Grendell, supra note 5, at 49.
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. In re Estate of Ehlke, 27 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Wis. 1947).
69. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1988).
70. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
1991]
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v. Palo,71 the court heard divorce proceedings between two ser-
vicemembers.72 The plaintiff wife managed to appear by requesting ex-
cess leave from service and borrowing money for the trip.'3  The
defendant husband made no such efforts.74 Since the husband did not act
with due diligence, the court refused the husband's request for a stay."
Similarly, other courts have considered various circumstances in
finding that a servicemember had not acted with due diligence to appear
in court. For example, in Underhill v. Barnes,76 the court denied the
defendant's request for a stay taking judicial notice of the fact that the
defendant had fifty days of accrued leave but failed to appear. 7 7 Addi-
tionally, in Keefe v. Spangenburg,71 the court noted that the ser-
vicemember was serving voluntarily during peacetime when requesting a
stay, and refused to grant a stay.79
The procedure for requesting a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act is unique. Requesting a stay pursuant to the Act is not
the same as is required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
this type of motion." The primary distinction for a motion to stay under
the Act is that the stay may be requested at any time during the proceed-
ings as long as it is within the party's "period of ... service or within
sixty days thereafter."" l Accordingly, the precise language of section 521
dictates that a party's contention that a motion for continuance is un-
timely should fail.82
B. Reopening Default Judgments
Under section 520(4) of the Act, servicemembers may request courts
to set aside judgments entered against them and reopen cases against
them if the servicemembers did not obtain stays of proceedings. 83 This
section of the Act provides relief in accordance with the purposes of the
71. 299 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1980).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 578.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 288 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
77. Id.
78. 533 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
79. Id.
80. Compare 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1988) with FED. R. Civ. P. 62.
81. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1988).
82. Semler v. Oertwig, 12 N.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Iowa 1943).
83. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(4) 1988.
[Vol. 27:45
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Act by insuring that servicemembers have the opportunity to appear to
defend their rights against opposing parties.
The procedure for reopening a default judgment begins with an ap-
plication to the trial court. Servicemembers or their counsel must ob-
serve two time limitations which apply to this procedure. First, the
judgment must have been rendered during the servicemember's term of
service in the military or within thirty days after discharge.8 4 Second,
the servicemember must seek to reopen the judgment while still on active
duty or within ninety days of discharge.8"
In order to reopen a default judgment, a servicemember must not
have appeared in the proceeding. The court will determine what consti-
tutes an appearance. This requirement may be rather difficult to satisfy if
servicemembers are aware of actions against them and attempt to protect
their interests despite the hardships of also serving on active duty.
Courts have found appearances in cases where defendants them-
selves never actually appeared. In Blankenship v. Blankenship,86 the
court found that a defendant appeared when his counsel appeared in
court to request that the complaint and service be quashed. 7 Likewise,
in Vara v. Vara,8 8 the court deemed a motion for postponement an ap-
pearance. Further, some courts have declared letters from legal aid at-
torneys requesting stays to be appearances.8 9
However, servicemembers may use several means to avoid making
appearances in court. A servicemember may simply choose not to make
any contact with the court. In practice, this may often be the case where
a remote defendant cannot come to the courthouse to appear and does
not know the alternatives for entering an appearance.
If servicemembers wish to notify a court that they will be unable to
appear, their commanding officers may send some limited communica-
tion to the court, such as a letter or telegram. Also, servicemembers may
notify opposing counsel in writing of their intent to receive protection
under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
Few members of the bar have consistently fulfilled the requirements
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 82 So. 2d 335, 340 (Ala. 1955).
87. Id.
88. 171 N.E.2d 384, 392 (Ohio 1961).
89. See Skates v. Stockton, 683 P.2d 304, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Artis-Wergin v. Artis-
Wergin, 444 N.W.2d 750, 753-54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). See also Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act Notes, 27-50-194 ARMY LAW., 39 (1989). But see Kramer v. Kramer, 668 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (letter from legal aid attorney deemed not an appearance).
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of section 520 of the Act which requires plaintiffs to file an affidavit with
the court stating the military status of the defendants. Before a court
may enter a default judgment, opposing counsel will have to disclose a
servicemember's status in an affidavit to the court.9" Accordingly, the
court should then be aware of a military defendant who may be able to
invoke the Act. An affidavit of military service is required only when the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act is applicable,91 and only when
there is no appearance by the defendant servicemember.92 As the affida-
vit requirement is only for the servicemember's benefit,93 only ser-
vicemembers may seek to enforce compliance with the requirement.9 4
Furthermore, a plaintiff's failure to comply with this requirement will
not result in a dismissal of the action,95 but a default judgment without
this type of affidavit is voidable.96
When a court realizes a defendant is a member of the armed forces,
the court must appoint a lawyer to represent the servicemember's inter-
ests under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.97 Counsel ap-
pointed for this purpose does not act to represent the servicemember's
interests in the case at bar, but acts only within the Act's provisions.9"
Thus, the appointed attorney is generally limited to requesting a stay of
proceedings under section 521. 9 The appointment of an attorney for an
absent defendant servicemember likely does not constitute an appearance
by the servicemember. The attorney may not waive any of the ser-
vicemember's rights."° However, a servicemember may explicitly grant
to an attorney the power to represent the servicemember's interests in the
90. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(1) (1988). Section 520(1) of the 1988 version of the Act provides in
pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding commenced in any court, if there shall be a default of any
appearance by the defendant, the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall file in the court
an affidavit setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not in military service. If
unable to file such affidavit plaintiff shall in lieu thereof file an affidavit setting forth either
that the defendant is in the military service or that plaintiff is not able to determine
whether or not defendant is in such service.
91. See State ex rel. McGaughty v. Grayston, 163 S.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Mo. 1942).
92. Hilts v. Taft, 200 A.2d 483 (Conn. 1964).
93. Hynds v. City of Ada, 158 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla. 1945).
94. See id. See also Snapp v. Scott, 167 P.2d 870, 873 (Okla. 1946).
95. See Oliver v. Oliver, 12 So. 2d 852, 854 (Ala. 1943). See also Wiltse v. Wiltse, 47 A.2d 540
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1946).
96. See Davidson v. General Fin. Corp., 295 F. Supp. 878, 881 (D. Ga. 1968). See also Snapp,
167 P.2d 870; Hynds, 158 P.2d 907.
97. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(1) (1988). The court may also require that the plaintiff file a bond to
assure protection of the defendant servicemember should the judgment later be set aside. Id.
98. Id. § 520(3).
99. In re Estate of Ehlke, 27 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Wis. 1947).
100. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(3) (1988).
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suit, thus waiving the protection of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act. In this event, because the servicemember is deemed adequately rep-
resented, the case would proceed as if the defendant were present.
In order to reopen a judgment, defendant servicemembers bear the
burden of establishing two points. First, the servicemembers must show
that at the time of judgment their ability to protect their interests was
prejudiced by reason of their military service.10' Second, defendant ser-
vicemembers must show that they had meritorious defenses to the ac-
tions against them. 10 2 This final requirement prevents the waste of
judicial time by unnecessarily reopening judgments for which the defend-
ant has no chance of prevailing.
C. Stay of Execution of Judgment
Another form of relief available to servicemembers against whom a
judgment has been issued is a stay or vacation of the execution of the
judgment. ' 3 This relief may be invoked in suits which have been
commenced before, during, or within sixty days after the end of the pe-
riod of service.'" A servicemember, another person acting on a ser-
vicemember's behalf, or a court may, sua sponte, move for the stay or
vacation of execution on a judgment. A court may stay an execution of
judgment against a servicemember' 05 or "vacate or stay any attachment
or garnishment of property, money, or debts .... ,o6 Again, as in sec-
tion 521 for stays of proceedings, a servicemember must show that ser-
vicemember's ability to comply with the judgment is materially affected
by military service. 10 7
VI. MATERIAL EFFEcT
At issue in stays of proceedings, the reopening of default judgments,
and stays of execution of judgment is the servicemembers' ability to pro-
tect the rights or interests being materially affected by their service in the
armed forces. Merely meeting the definitional requirements and follow-
ing the correct procedures is not sufficient to invoke the Act's protection.
Defendant servicemembers must also show that the military service has
101. Id. § 520(4).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 523.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 523(a).
106. Id. § 523(b).
107. Id. § 523.
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had a "material effect" on their ability to prosecute or defend their rights
in the case. This factual issue must be determined by the trial court in
each case.10
8
Courts may in their discretion determine whether a material effect
exists in a case."°9 Several cases illustrate circumstances in which courts
have used their discretion to determine whether the servicemembers'
ability to protect their rights was materially affected by their military
service. Courts tend to protect this right. In Gilbride v. City of Algona,
110 the court determined that two soldiers who each owned a one/four-
teenth interest in a tract of land did not have their rights materially af-
fected by their service when the city began condemnation proceedings.III
Although they were not present for the proceedings, the co-defendants in
the case, who were close relatives of the servicemembers, pursued the
same legal interests as the servicemembers." 2 The Supreme Court of
Iowa affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that it was within
the trial court's discretion to determine "whether or not the party would
be materially affected in his ability to prosecute or defend an action by
reason of his military service."' 1 3
Similarly, in Tabor v. Miller,"4 the appellant was serving on active
duty in the U.S. Air Force in Alabama when he was involved in an auto
accident." 5 In a personal injury case brought against the ser-
vicemember, the servicemember's counsel twice asked a Pennsylvania
court to indefinitely postpone the proceeding before trial, stating that the
Air Force pilot was stationed in Alabama while the court was in Penn-
sylvania." 6 Denying the requests, the United States Court of Appeals
Third Circuit sustained the trial court's decision, noting that the defend-
ant did not say it was "impossible" for him to appear.' 7 Neither the
serviceman nor his counsel suggested that the trial be held while the ser-
viceman was on Christmas leave, or that the court schedule a weekend
session for his testimony." 8 The appellate court found that the trial
108. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-166 SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF AcT 12
(1962).
109. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 564-65. (1943).
110. 20 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1945).
111. Id. at 906-07.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 907.
114. 389 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
115. Id. at 646.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 647.
118. Id.
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court had adequately exercised its discretion in denying the stay.' 19
As in Tabor, the appellant in Hackman v. Postel,120 a servicemember
on active duty in the U.S. Navy, sought a stay of proceedings in a case
stemming from an auto accident. 21 The servicemember's insurance car-
rier provided counsel to represent him in the case. 1" Like the Air Force
pilot in Tabor, the servicemember in Hackman failed to convince the
court that his service in the military materially affected his ability to ap-
pear in court. 123  The court denied the stay, reasoning that the ser-
vicemember neither asserted that he was unable to attend the trial nor
provided any evidence that he had tried to obtain leave from his duties in
order to appear. 24 The court also took into account the fact that the
serviceman was being represented by his insurance company's counsel. 2 '
In order to meet Congress' goal of protecting servicemembers,
courts should grant relief under the Act whenever possible without pro-
viding the means by which litigants could abuse the judicial system.
Logically, courts have allowed litigants to invoke the protections of the
Act most often in times of national crisis.'26 Equally so, they have re-
fused protection during times of peace when the servicemembers could
have more easily obtained leave to appear in ourt.127
VII. ANALYSIS
The Act's purpose is to prevent the full adjudication of actions in-
volving servicemembers in their absence. 2 ' Additionally, Congress
wanted to ensure that servicemembers would not be distracted from their
duties by these concerns. Congress, however, did not address which
119. Id.
120. 675 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1333.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1134.
125. Id. at 1132. The court in Hackman noted:
Where it is reasonable to infer that an insurance company is attempting to use § 521 as a
means of postponing and perhaps defeating liability and that the defendant serviceman will
not be materially benefitted [sic] by a stay, the trial court is justified in refusing to injure the
plaintiff for the sole advantage of the insurance company.
Id. at 1134.
126. This is evident by the requests for relief under the Act which were granted during and
immediately after World War II.
127. See Tabor v. Miller, 389 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Hackman, 675 F. Supp. at 1132.
But see Gilbride v. City of Algona, 20 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1945).
128. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
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party bears the burden of showing that a servicemember's ability is mate-
rially affected by military service. The most reasonable way to carry out
the intent of Congress is for courts to shift the burden of proving material
effect from the servicemember to the opposing party. Servicemembers
meet their initial burden by producing evidence of their active-duty ser-
vice in the armed forces. 29 At this point, the burden of proving that
military service does not materially affect servicemembers' ability to par-
ticipate in civil proceedings or to fulfill the requirements of a judgment
should shift to the servicemembers' opponents. As a result, ser-
vicemembers will be more adequately protected and freed to carry out
their military duty. Furthermore, it enhances courts' ability to apply the
Act with uniformity and certainty, increasing the possibility of consistent
relief for members of the armed forces. 130
The goal of the Act is to protect servicemembers from the distrac-
tions and anxiety which may be associated with their civil obligations.
The same obligations which materially affect servicemembers' ability to
participate in legal proceedings or fulfill legal obligations also hinder the
servicemembers' ability to prove they are materially affected by their mil-
itary service. If courts continue to require servicemembers to prove ex-
haustively that their service materially affects their ability to appear and
defend an action, the purpose of the Act will be defeated: ser-
vicemembers would still be concerned with the possibility and conse-
quences of failing to meet this burden.
Courts have inconsistently allocated the burden of proving whether
prejudice to a servicemember will result from not invoking the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act's protections. In some instances courts have
placed the burden of proof on the servicemember requesting the stay, 131
and in other instances on the party resisting the stay.13 2 The United
States Supreme Court held in Boone v. Lightner 1 33 that the onus of prov-
ing prejudice to the absent servicemember is on the party who should be
qualified to make such proof under all the facts and circumstances. 134
129. Sufficient evidence could be a sworn affidavit from the servicemember, counsel, or other
interested persons.
130. See Kathleen H. Switzer, Mortgage Defaults and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act:
Assigning the Burden of Proof When Applying the Material Effect Test, 18 REAL EsT. J. 171, 174
(1989).
131. See Pope v. United Fidelity & Guar. Co., 20 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942) and Elkind v.
Elkind, 41 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1943). See also Hackman, 675 F. Supp. at 1133.
132. Bowsman v. Peterson, 45 F. Supp. 741, 743 (D. Neb. 1942); Reynolds v. Haulcroft, 170
S.W.2d 678, 680 (Ark. 1943).
133. 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
134. Id. at 569-70.
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The Court "refrain[ed] from declaring any rigid doctrine of burden of
proof in this matter, believing that courts will usually have enough sound
sense to know from what direction their information would be expected
to come."
135
In Boone the Supreme Court did not establish a uniform allocation
of the burden of showing whether servicemembers' ability to defend ac-
tions is materially affected by their military service.136 Instead, the Court
deferred to the trial court's discretion in determining which party bears
the burden of proof on this issue.137 In so holding, the Court looked to
the language of the Act and noted that:
The Act makes no express provision as to who must carry the burden
of showing that a party will or will not be prejudiced, in pursuance no
doubt of its policy of making the law flexible to meet the great variety
of situations no legislator and no court is wise enough to foresee. We,
too, refrain from declaring any rigid doctrine of burden of proof in this
matter, believing that courts called upon to use discretion will usually
have enough sound sense to know from what direction their informa-
tion should be expected to come .... We think the ultimate discretion
includes a discretion as to whom the court may ask to come forward
with facts needful to a fair judgment. 138
"Material effect" is an equitable concept which is central to the
Act.13 9 The term "material effect" may refer to the effect on ser-
vicemembers' participation in legal proceedings, or fulfillment of finan-
cial obligations caused by their service in the military."' As to stays of
proceedings or reopening of default judgments, "material effect" refers to
servicemembers' ability to appear in court for the civil proceedings."
Regarding stays of execution of judgment, "material effect" refers to ser-
vicemembers' ability to fulfill the requirements of the judgment, whether
legal or equitable relief for the prevailing party.
Courts have not consistently placed the burden of proving material
effect on one party. In some instances the court has placed the burden on
135. Id. at 569.
136. Id. at 569-70.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
141. To oppose a stay of proceedings, a party must show that: (1) the servicemember is deliber-
ately and willfully attempting to avoid the ultimate determination of the issues; (2) the ser-
vicemember is not acting in good faith; (3) the servicemember has had adequate time and
opportunity to prepare his case; and (4) the servicemember is wrongfully invoking the Act as a
shield. Id. See also J. D. Bucky Allshouse, Overcoming the Obstacles of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Relief Act, 3 FAM. ADvoc. 36 (1981).
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servicemembers; in others the burden rests with the opposing parties. In
still others, the court has placed a minimal burden on servicemembers to
state they are in the armed forces. The burden then shifts to the oppos-
ing party to prove that service in the military does not materially affect
servicemembers' ability to protect their interests.
Cases which have placed the burden on servicemembers include
Plesniak v. Wiegand 142 and Pope v. United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 143 In
Plesniak, the court clearly placed the initial burden on the ser-
vicemember and provided relevant factors to be considered by the court
to decide if the servicemember was "materially affected." 1" In Pope, an
initial review also placed the burden on the servicemember to prove ma-
terial effect. 145
In Plesniak, the defendant sought to invoke the Act to stay proceed-
ings to determine liability in a case concerning an automobile collision. 146
The court held that servicemembers may be entitled to stays of proceed-
ings under section 521 if they establish they are on active duty in the
military; they are not or will not be present for the trial; their absence
during the trial would materially affect their ability to prosecute or de-
fend; and their military status is the proximate cause of their inability to
be present for trial. 147
The court in Plesniak examined several cases and determined that a
number of factors are relevant to a court in deciding whether a party's
absence is due to military duty. The relevant factors courts should con-
sider include:
(1) [W]hether the movant had made some statement as to when he
could be available for the trial; (2) whether the movant had attempted
to apply for leave from the military; (3) the length ... between the
original filing of the suit and the movant's final motion for a stay; and
(4) the length of time during which the movant had notice of the up-
coming trial date.1
48
Thus, the court not only clearly placed the burden of proving material
effect on the servicemember, it provided the elements to be shown and
the factors to be considered. In Plesniak, the party did not indicate when
he could be available for trial in the future, or that he had tried to get
142. 335 N.E.2d 131 (Il. App. Ct. 1975).
143. 20 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942).
144. Plesniak, 335 N.E.2d at 136-137.
145. Pope, 20 S.E.2d at 621.
146. Plesniak, 335 N.E.2d at 133.
147. Id at 135.
148. Plesniak, 335 N.E.2d at 136-37 (citations omitted).
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leave from duty in Georgia and Colorado to appear at trial. 4 9 The ser-
vicemember had previously been granted three stays during the four and
one half years since commencement of the suit.'50 Additionally, the trial
had been scheduled for a time when the servicemember had indicated
that he would be in town and had received adequate notice.' The sol-
dier, as a result, failed to meet the burden which the court had set out.
In contrast to the court's placement of the burden on the ser-
vicemember in Plesniak, the court in Pope initially placed the burden on
the servicemember but subsequently shifted the burden.' 52 In Pope, the
petitioner sought relief from judgment execution and garnishment pro-
ceedings.' The servicemember, a lieutenant-colonel serving at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, filed a petition stating that he was on active
duty and a defendant in the proceeding.5 4 He alleged that as a result of
these two factors he was entitled to suspension of proceedings under the
Act."'5 After the court stayed the proceedings for thirty days, the ser-
vicemember again petitioned the court for the same relief under the same
petition.'56 This time, however, the opposing party, USF & G responded
with its contentions as to why the procedural relief should not be granted
to the servicemember.15 7
Unlike the servicemember's first request, the court refused his sec-
ond request.1 58 The servicemember's second petition alleged no reasons
why he should be granted a stay, other than he was in the Army.'59 He
offered no further evidence in support of his application for the stay and
abatement of the proceedings."e USF & G, on the other hand, filed a
verified answer alleging that the servicemember drew a salary and subsis-
tence allowance totalling six to seven thousand dollars per year.' 6' USF
& G's answer further alleged that the servicemember did not seek relief
in good faith because, inter alia, of his ability to pay the debt. 62
149. Id. at 134-35.
150. Id. at 134.
151. Id.
152. Pope, 20 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 620.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The answer also alleged that when the servicemember had initially sought a stay he had
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The Georgia Court of Appeals found that the trial court had prop-
erly denied the request for a stay because the servicemember did not state
any reason for a stay except that he was in the service.16 3 Nothing in the
record showed that the servicemember's ability to comply with the judg-
ment was materially affected by reason of his service in the Army."'
The court in Pope placed a burden on servicemembers to show that their
duty in the armed forces materially affected their ability to comply with a
judgment order. Consequently, the servicemember failed to show the
requisite material effect under sections 521 and 524 of the Act.
In contrast with Plesniak and Pope, other courts have placed the
burden of proving material effect on the litigant who is not engaged in
military service. This ensures full protection of the Act. Courts have
aimed at fulfilling the goals of the Act via liberal interpretations of sec-
tion 524 of the Act. Cases so holding include Bowsman v. Peterson,16
Meyers v. Schmidt, 66 and Reynolds v. Haulcroft.167
In Bowsman v. Peterson, the court held that the party resisting an
application for a stay carries the burden of proving the absence of mate-
rial effect. 6 ' Bowsman concerned a plaintiff's action to recover for per-
sonal injuries and property loss resulting from an automobile collision. 69
The defendant servicemember sought a stay of proceedings pursuant to
section 521 of the Act for the remainder of his military service.1 70 The
court, examining the language of section 524 regarding stays of proceed-
ings, acknowledged that the language is permissive. 171 Nonetheless, the
court construed section 524 to mean that upon application for a stay,
courts have no discretion to deny a motion unless a party's ability to
conduct his defense is not materially affected.172 The court then placed
the burden of showing lack of material effect on the opposing party.1 73
represented to the court that he only desired a short time to negotiate a settlement on the judgment.
He then failed to make any effort to settle with USF&G. Id.
163. Id. at 620-21.
164. Id.
165. 45 F. Supp. 741 (D. Neb. 1942).
166. 46 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1944).
167. 170 S.W.2d 678 (Ark. 1943).
168. 45 F. Supp. at 741 (D. Neb. 1942).
169. Id. at 742.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 743.
172. Id.
173. "That language of the Act appears to the court to impose upon the party resisting the
application for stay the burden of satisfying the court of the absence of material impairment by
military service of the defendant's ability to defend himself." Id.
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The court in Bowsman further justified placing this burden on ser-
vicemembers' opponents based on the purpose of the Act.'7 4 The court
noted that few instances warrant denial of relief to servicemembers re-
quested under the Act.'75 It is important to note that this case was de-
cided in a time of war and perhaps the court would have rendered a
contrary decision in peace time. This consideration was certainly part of
the decision to allow a stay.'76
The defendant in Meyers v. Schmidt 17 7 received even greater protec-
tion under the Act. The defendant, Schmidt, was serving on active duty
in the armed forces. 17  Although Schmidt knew of the foreclosure pro-
ceedings and had asked for a chance to contact an attorney, 179 neither
the court nor Schmidt's attorney knew his whereabouts when the pro-
ceeding began."' 0 At that time, Schmidt's attorney was unable to inform
the court of whether the servicemember's ability to comply with the
mortgage terms was materially affected by reason of his military ser-
vice.1 ' The court held that although Schmidt had no defense to the
action, he was still entitled to the protection of the statute.8 2 By provid-
ing protection despite the faults in Schmidt's defense, the court resolved
any doubt as to whether servicemembers are entitled to a stay of proceed-
ings under the Act.
The court in Meyers also allowed full protection of the Act by plac-
ing the burden on the servicemember's opponent to show that the ser-
vicemember was not materially affected. Before the court would enter its
judgment, the plaintiff was required to show that the defendant's military
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. "The soldier or sailor in seasons of war has neither time nor mental aptitude for litigation."
Id. (emphasis added). The court also cites previous statutes from the Civil War and the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918 which were temporary enactments. The Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940 was a temporary provision for the period of World War ii. See supra note
31 and accompanying text.
177. 46 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. County Ct. 1944).
178. Id. at 421.
179. The servicemember had sent a letter to the judge indicating that he was going to "'try to
straighten the mess out."' Id. He stated that he had received" 'a copy of the motion and affidavit
for the foreclosure of the mortgage-that a large part of them are false .... I am going to ask you as
a favor to set this motion aside so that I will be able to get in touch with the legal department of the
Navy.'" Id.
180. Id. at 421-22. Schmidt failed to respond to letters from both the court and his appointed
attorney which were mailed to the address on the letter Schmidt sent to the judge. Id.
181. Id. at 422.
182. Id. Compare the relief of a stay under § 521, which does not require an absent party to
assert a valid defense in order to seek the reopening of a default judgment, with § 520, which re-
quires a servicemember to show that he has a meritorious or legal defense.
1991]
21
Day: Material Effect: Shifting the Burden of Proof for Greater Procedu
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
service did not materially affect his ability to meet his obligation. 83
Since the plaintiff did not meet his burden, the court stayed the proceed-
ings for sixty days and the servicemember's attorney was ordered to try
to locate the defendant.1
8 4
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Haulcroft, 85 the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that a stay under the Act is mandatory unless the party resisting the
stay satisfies the court by clear and convincing evidence that there is no
impairment of the servicemember's rights.186 Reynolds was a member of
the United States Navy when the plaintiff filed suit against him.1 8 7 He
sought relief under the Act but the trial court denied his request.'8 8 The
Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the trial court for abuse of discre-
tion holding that the language of section 521 should be interpreted so
that "the burden is on the party resisting a stay of proceedings of satisfy-
ing the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that the rights of
the soldier or sailor would not be impaired, while in such military ser-
vice, by denying the stay of proceedings.' 8 9 The court reasoned that
"[a] most liberal construction must always be given to the provisions of
this Act to the end that all rights and interests of anyone serving in the
armed forces may be fully protected and safeguarded."'"
Placing the burden on the opposing parties is beneficial to the ser-
vicemembers and fulfills the purposes of the Act.' 9 Yet this allocation
does not allow servicemembers to take unfair advantage of the Act's in-
tended protection.
The best means of protecting servicemembers without unfairly prej-
udicing opposing parties is described in Parker v. Parker.92 In Parker,
the court held that an applicant should be granted a stay of judicial pro-
ceedings "upon the bare statement that he is at the time actively in mili-
tary service; and unless something appears sufficient to show that his
rights, as a litigant, will not be materially affected by a determination of
the pending litigation, it is mandatory that the application be
183. According to the court in Meyers, "[a] reading of that statute... will ... show that the
burden is on the plaintiff to show before judgment can be entered, that military service does not
materially affect the defendant's ability to meet his obligation." Meyers, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
184. Id. at 423.
185. 170 S.W.2d 678 (Ark. 1943).
186. Id. at 680.
187. Id. at 679.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 680.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
192. 63 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1951).
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granted." 193
In Parker, a husband servicemember brought a divorce proceeding
against his wife, who filed a counterclaim. 194 As a result of his wife's
counterclaim, the plaintiff husband then sought a stay of proceedings
under the Act through his counsel of record. 9 Although the record
showed that plaintiff was serving on active duty in the Korean conflict,
no evidence indicated that his rights would not be materially affected if
the court denied his request for a stay of proceedings. 196
Analogous to Parker, La Face v. Incorvia 19' held that once an affida-
vit is fied stating that a party is in the military service, the burden shifts
to the adverse party to show lack of material effect.' 9 Unfortunately,
the court provided no reasoning for its holding. It simply stated that
after extensive examinations of the Act and cases arising thereunder, it
was of the opinion that "upon the filing of the affidavit, a stay of proceed-
ings becomes mandatory, unless a sufficient showing can be made by the
adverse party that the ability of the party in military service to prosecute
or defend his action is not materially affected by reason of his military
service."' 199 After a guardian ad litem filed an affidavit that the defendant
was in the military service, the court placed all burden on the opposing
party to refute the presumption of military duty materially affecting an
ability to participate in proceedings. 2 ° This presumption arises upon the
filing of an affidavit stating the party is serving in the military.2"'
Shifting the burden of proving material effect best effectuates the
purposes of the Act. The cases which have granted relief to ser-
vicemembers upon the filing of an affidavit stating a party is an active
servicemember have freed servicemembers to carry out their duties as
required by the military. They need not concern themselves with what
the courts will require to show material effect. The party opposing the
stay, who is not under the demands of military duty, will then have to
prove that the servicemembers' abilities to meet legal obligations are not
materially affected by military service. The times which servicemembers
would be required to support the issue of material effect would likely be
193. Id. at 367-68.
194. Id. at 367.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 367-68.
197. 113 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
198. Id. at 129.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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the times that they are free to do so. Courts should require ser-
vicemembers to make this showing only when the opposing party has
proven that the servicemembers are not materially affected by their mili-
tary service.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Most cases interpreting the Act were decided during times of war.
Current interest in the Act stems from a war in which the United States
deployed many troops and called many reserve servicemembers to active
duty. For this reason, Congress has also directed its attention toward
meeting the needs of servicemembers by seeking to provide even greater
relief through amendments to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
It will be the duty of the courts to continue to protect the interests of
American service personnel as they act to protect the interests of the
United States.
When a servicemember is materially affected by his military service
and is unable to participate in proceedings or fulfill obligations of a judg-
ment, he is also prejudiced in his ability to furnish evidence to meet the
burden of proving that his active duty is materially affecting his abilities.
This prejudice would be inconsistent with the purpose and goals of the
Act to require the servicemember to meet the burden of proving material
effect. It is thus recommended that courts place an initial burden on
servicemembers to allege that they are materially affected by their mili-
tary service. Opposing parties may then counter this assertion if they
establish that the servicemembers' ability to defend actions is not materi-
ally affected by military service. Such use of evidentiary burdens is con-
sistent with the purposes of the Act.
Mary Kathleen Day
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